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Jay-Z Has 99 Problems but a Sample Ain’t One 
 
 On October 21, 2015, a federal judge granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of rapper Jay-Z (aka Shawn Carter), music producer Timbaland (aka Timothy Mosely), and over twenty 
other named defendants, dismissing an eight year copyright infringement suit for lack of standing.1 The 
plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in 2007, alleging that Jay-Z’s song “Big Pimpin’” infringed on his 
rights in the song “Khosara, Khosara.”2 One week into the trial, the judge determined that the plaintiff 
lacked standing to pursue his infringement claim.3 Despite the judge’s efforts to sort out the complex 
international copyrights issues, the judge’s determination has serious flaws in the evaluation of an 
agreement entered into by the plaintiff, as well as Egyptian copyright law, that could allow the plaintiff to 
prevail on appeal.   
The Clash over “Big Pimpin’” 
 The plaintiff, Osama Ahmed Fahmy, is the nephew and heir of the late Baligh Hamdi, a famous 
Egyptian music composer, who authored the musical composition “Khosara, Khosara” in or about 1957.4 
The copyright in “Khosara, Khosara” was registered under Egyptian law in or about 1960 by Mr. Hamdi.5 
Upon Mr. Hamdi’s death in 1993, the copyright ownership in “Khosara, Khosara” was initially inherited by 
his siblings, and eventually ended up being jointly owned by his siblings’ children, one of whom is the 
plaintiff.6 “Big Pimpin’” was a hit single from Jay-Z’s 1999 album Vol. 3 . . . Life and Times of S. Carter.7  
Both the album and the single achieved substantial commercial success. The album has been certified 
triple platinum (selling over three million records)8, and earned a Grammy nomination for Best Rap Album 
at the 43rd Annual Grammy Awards.9 The single “Big Pimpin’” was at the top of five different Billboard 
Singles charts in 200010, and earned a Grammy nomination for Best Rap Performance by a Duo or Group.11 
The song was a result of the collaborative efforts of Jay-Z and Timbaland, with Jay-Z writing the lyrics and 
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Timbaland producing the beat.12 The beat incorporates a sample of the first four measures in “Khosara, 
Khosara” playing in an ongoing loop.13 The use of this sample is at issue in the infringement suit.  
 The defendants asserted that they held a valid license to use portions of “Khosara, Khosara” in 
“Big Pimpin’,” and that license derived from rights originally granted by Hamdi to Sout el Phan, an Egyptian 
recording company in 1968.14 The license was granted as a part of a $100,000 settlement agreement 
between the defendants and EMI Music Arabia, the company that controlled the distribution of “Khosara, 
Khosara” outside of Egypt.15 The plaintiff contended that the rights originally granted by his uncle in 1968, 
and by the plaintiff in later agreements, covered only the right to make sound recordings of “Khosara, 
Khosara” and not the right to make derivative works such as “Big Pimpin’.”16 Further, the plaintiff asserted 
that under Egyptian law, the right to make derivative works is an inalienable moral right reserved by the 
author and his heirs.17 Ultimately, neither the judge nor the jury made a determination on the merits of 
the infringement action. Instead, the judge determined that the defendant was entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit.18 
The Lack of Standing Determination 
 The first phase of the weeklong bifurcated jury trial concluded on October 20, 2015.19 The same 
day, the defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 50 and 52 contending, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the 
infringement suit.20 The judge’s determination rested on two bases: (1) Egyptian morality rights are not 
recognized in the United States, and (2) the plaintiff relinquished all of his economic rights in the musical 
composition of “Khosara, Khosara” by entering into an agreement with an Egyptian record label in 2002.21 
 First, the judge determined that the plaintiff could not pursue a copyright infringement claim 
based on moral rights in the United States.22 The doctrine of moral rights recognizes that an author (and 
the author’s heirs) has certain inalienable and non-transferrable rights to control the fate of his work, and 
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to protect the personal and reputational value of the work as a reflection of the author.23 Egypt recognizes 
moral rights in all copyrights, but the United States recognizes moral rights only in certain visual art.24 As 
such, the plaintiff’s only recourse for the violation of moral rights in the musical compilation of “Khosara, 
Khosara” is “to go into Egypt before an Egyptian court and ask it to enforce” those rights.25 
 Second, the judge determined that the plaintiff relinquished all of his rights in the musical 
composition of “Khosara, Khosara” in 2002, and his standing to sue for infringement ended at that time. 
Under the Copyright Act, only “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is 
entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she 
is the owner of it.”26 Pursuant to the Act, if the plaintiff transferred all of his economic rights in “Khosara, 
Khosara” to another individual or entity prior to the filing of the infringement suit, he would not be the 
legal owner and would lack standing. Central to the issue are several agreements that granted different 
exclusive rights to different entities in regards to “Khosara, Khosara.” In 1968, Hamdi entered into an 
agreement with Sout el Phan, an Egyptian company, through which some rights in “Khosara, Khosara” 
were transferred.27 In August 1995, an agreement between the plaintiff and Sout el Phan confirmed the 
“continuing viability” of the rights conferred in the 1968 agreement.28 In December 1995, Sout el Phan 
transferred some exclusive distribution rights in “Khosara, Khosara” to EMI Music Arabia.29 In March 2001, 
a settlement agreement between EMI Music Arabia and Timbaland granted rights to exploit “Khosara, 
Khosara” “in perpetuity, throughout the world . . . free and clear of any claim” by EMI Music Arabia.30 The 
plaintiff maintained that none of the above agreements entered into by him or his uncle conferred the 
right to make derivative works, but rather only conferred the right to make recordings of “Khosara, 
Khosara.”31  
 However, the crux of the standing issue was a 2002 agreement. Sometime in 2001, control of Sout 
el Phan’s musical catalogue passed to Alam el Phan, another Egyptian entity.32 In 2002, the plaintiff signed 
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an agreement entitled “Authorization to Print, Publish, Sell, and Circulate” with Mohsen Mohammed 
Jaber, the owner of Alam el Phan.33 The defendants argued that this 2002 agreement constituted a full 
and complete assignment of all of the plaintiff’s rights in the copyright of “Khosara, Khosara.”34 The 
defendants further contended that Mohsen Mohammed Jaber became the legal owner of the copyright 
in 2002, such that only Jaber would have legal standing in an infringement suit--not the plaintiff.35 The 
plaintiff testified that the purpose of the 2002 agreement was simply to “authorize the same rights that 
had been authorized originally from Baligh Hamdi to Sout el Phan . . . because of the sale of Sout el Phan” 
to Alam el Phan.36  
 The court adopted the defendants’ stance, concluding that the 2002 agreement assigned all of 
the plaintiff’s economic rights in “Khosara, Khosara” to Jaber, and Jaber became “solely,” “fully,” and 
“irrevocably” the owner of all of those rights.37 Taking a “plain meaning” textualist approach, the judge 
concluded that the plain language of the agreement made it clear that the plaintiff made a broad 
conveyance of all of his rights to Jaber, and did not merely renew the rights previously given in the 1968 
and 1995 agreements. 38  In response, the plaintiff argued that the conveyance was legally deficient 
because it failed to comply with Egyptian law, which requires the agreement to contain explicit and 
detailed indication of each right being transferred, precluding the kinds of blanket assignments that were 
included in the agreement.39 The judge also rejected this argument, finding that under Egyptian law, if 
some rights are being conveyed, then a detailed list of those rights must be included.40 But if all rights are 
being transferred, then simply making a blanket statement of “all rights” is acceptable.41 Therefore, the 
plain language of the agreement and Egyptian law supported the conclusion that the plaintiff lacked 
standing because he ceased to be the legal owner of the copyright in “Khosara, Khosara” once he signed 
the 2002 agreement.   
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Critique of the Determination 
 The judge was not in a position to adequately evaluate the text of the agreement implementing 
a “plain meaning” textualist approach, or to make determinations about Egyptian law that were not 
supported by expert testimony.  
The 2002 agreement was written in Arabic. During the trial, the court had to rely on an English 
translation which was inadequate to support the judge’s textualist approach. This inadequacy is 
highlighted in the judge’s decision. In the agreement, there was the following phrase: “maintaining our 
rights in respect of the public performance and mechanical printing.” 42  However, expert testimony 
explained that this phrase was translated from the Arabic word nisbah.43 According to the expert, nisbah 
refers to the right to receive royalties associated with a work of music.44 The right to retain royalties from 
a copyrighted work is very different from the above translation provided to the court regarding public 
performances and mechanical printing. An accurate translation would have stayed true to the meaning of 
nisbah. The proven presence of inadequate translations demonstrate that the “plain meaning” approach 
taken by the judge was inappropriate.45 
 The judge also made determinations on how Egyptian law is applied, but these determinations 
were not supported by the expert testimony given or the letter of the law. When determining whether or 
not Egyptian law requires explicit and detailed indications of the rights to be conveyed, no Egyptian rulings 
or examples were relied on. Instead, the defendants simply argued that if a copyright holder truly 
intended to transfer “all” economic rights, then specifically identifying each right to be conveyed in the 
agreement would be redundant and counterproductive.46 On the other hand, the Plaintiff maintained that 
an assignment of economic rights should specifically describe each right to be conveyed, even if all rights 
are being transferred.47 Under Egyptian law, for an assignment or transfer of rights to be valid, it must 
fulfill all of the imperative rules listed in Article 149 of Egyptian Law No. 82 of 2002.48 Article 149 requires 
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that the transfer be “certified in writing and contain an explicit and detailed indication of each right to be 
transferred with the extent and purpose of the transfer and the duration and place of exploitation.”49 
Despite the black letter of the Egyptian law, the judge agreed with the Defendants and found that when 
all rights are being conveyed, a blanket assignment is all that is necessary. Thus, a detailed indication of 
each right was not necessary to have an adequate agreement. This conclusion is contrary to Egyptian law 
and was not supported by any of the Egyptian law expert testimony. 
It is more plausible that the plaintiff intended to transfer all of the same reproduction and 
distribution rights that were given in the 1968 and 1995 agreements. The plaintiff took the same approach 
in 1995 to reconfirm the viability of the 1968 agreement when Sout el Phan was planning to extend rights 
to EMI Music Arabia. Reconfirming those rights again when yet another company became involved would 
have been reasonable under the circumstances.   
  These misguided and unsupported errors were outcome-determinative and caused the plaintiff 
to lose an eight year battle. If the judge had not found that the 2002 agreement conveyed all rights to 
Jaber, and that the English translation of the agreement was adequate, the plaintiff would have avoided 
dismissal and the issues would have been settled by the jury. Hopefully, the court of appeals takes a more 
sound approach, but until then, Jay-Z has one less problem.50 
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